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Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments
We study if and how social preferences extend to risky environments. We provide experimental evidence from different versions of dictator games with risky outcomes and establish that preferences thatExpand
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On the Design of Optimal Grandfathering Schemes for Emission Allowances
To meet its commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU plans to implement an emissions trading system with grandfathering of allowances. Besides having distributional impacts, the choice of theExpand
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Optimal Emission Pricing in the Presence of International Spillovers: Decomposing Leakage and Terms-of-Trade Motives
Carbon leakage provides an efficiency argument for differentiated emission prices in favor of emission-intensive and trade-exposed sectors under unilateral climate policy. However, differentialExpand
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On the Importance of Equity in International Climate Policy: An Empirical Analysis
Based on unique data from a world-wide survey of agents involved in international climate policy, this paper empirically analyzes the importance of equity in this field. We find that equity issuesExpand
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On the Self-Interested Use of Equity in International Climate Negotiations
We discuss self-interested uses of equity arguments in international climate negotiations. Using unique data from a world-wide survey of agents involved in international climate policy, we show thatExpand
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Economic Implications of Alternative Allocation Schemes for Emission Allowances
For reasons of political feasibility, emission trading systems may have to rely on free initial allocation of emission allowances in order to ameliorate adverse production and employment effects inExpand
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Cooperation in International Environmental Negotiations Due to a Preference for Equity
This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explained by preferences for equity. Within a N-country prisoner's dilemma in which agents can eitherExpand
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Using Lotteries to Finance Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence
This study explores the economics of charitable fund-raising. We begin by developing theory that examines the optimal lottery design while explicitly relaxing both risk-neutrality and preferenceExpand
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On the Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods – Experimental Evidence from the Lab
The provision of public goods often relies on voluntary contributions and cooperation. While most of the experimental literature focuses on individual contributions, many real-world problems involveExpand
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Is a Donor in Hand Better than Two in the Bush? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment
This study develops theory and conducts an experiment to provide an understanding of why people initially give to charities, why they remain committed to the cause, and what factors attenuate theseExpand
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