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  • Matthew Gentzkow, Jesse M Shapiro, Gary Becker, Gary Chamberlain, Raj Chetty, Tim Conley +10 others
  • 2006
We construct a new index of media slant that measures whether a news outlet's language is more similar to a congressional Republican or Democrat. We apply the measure to study the market forces that determine political content in the news. We estimate a model of newspaper demand that incorporates slant explicitly, estimate the slant that would be chosen if(More)
In the jungle, power and coercion govern the exchange of resources. We study a simple, stylised model of the jungle that mirrors an exchange economy. We define the notion of jungle equilibrium and demonstrate that a number of standard results of competitive markets hold in the jungle. In the typical analysis of an exchange economy, agents are involved in(More)
We examine the determinants of cooperation and the effectiveness of deterrence when fear is a motive for conflict. We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting, where coordination is easy, to those obtained in a setting with strategic risk, where players have different assessments of their environment. These two strategic settings allow us(More)
I introduce a microfounded model of campaign finance with office-seeking politicians, a continuum of voters, and a large number of heterogeneous lobbies. Lobbies make contributions to politicians according to a common agency framework. Politicians use contributions to finance their electoral expenditures. Voters are not fooled by electoral expenditures:(More)
What are the equilibrium features of a dynamic …nancial market in which traders care about their reputation for ability? We modify a standard sequential trading model to include traders with career concerns. We show that this market cannot be informationally e¢ cient: there is no equilibrium in which prices converge to the true value, even after an in…nite(More)
We provide evidence on the match between …rms, managers and incentives using a new survey designed for this purpose. The survey contains information on a sample of executives'risk preferences and human capital, on the explicit and implicit incentives they face and on the …rms they work for. We model a market for managerial talent where both …rms and(More)
  • David Stasavage, Simon Hix, Bernard Manin, Lisa Martin, John Odell, Andrea Prat +4 others
In recent years there have been numerous calls for making the operations of international organizations more " transparent+ " One element in these demands involves the idea that international negotiations should be open to the same level of outside scrutiny that is presumed to prevail with bargaining in domestic contexts+ While transparency of this sort may(More)
This paper studies a model of long-term contracting for experimentation. We consider a principal-agent relationship with adverse selection on the agent's ability, dynamic moral hazard , and private learning about project quality. We find that each of these elements plays an essential role in structuring dynamic incentives, and it is only their interaction(More)
We study the formation of a ruling coalition in nondemocratic societies where institutions do not enable political commitments. Each individual is endowed with a level of political' power. The ruling coalition consists of a subset of the individuals in the society and decides the distribution of resources. A ruling coalition needs to contain enough powerful(More)
We consider a game between a principal, an agent, and a monitor in which the principal would like to rely on messages by the monitor to target intervention against a misbehaving agent. The difficulty is that the agent can credibly threaten to retaliate against likely whistleblowers in the event of an intervention. In this setting intervention policies that(More)