In multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard, we provide sufficient conditions for the outcomes of pure-strategy equilibria in direct mechanisms to be preserved when principals can offer indirect communication schemes. The conditions include strong robustness in the direct mechanism game, as developed in the literature on competing mechanisms… (More)
This paper studies a model of long-term contracting for experimentation. We consider a principal-agent relationship with adverse selection on the agent's ability, dynamic moral hazard , and private learning about project quality. We find that each of these elements plays an essential role in structuring dynamic incentives, and it is only their interaction… (More)
This paper studies the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) adverse selection environment, relaxing the assumption of exclusivity of insurance contracts. There are three types of agents that differ in their risk level, their riskiness is private information and known before any contract is signed. Agents can engage in multiple insurance contracts simultaneously ,… (More)
This note presents a counterexample to Theorems 3 and 4 in Peters . This note is an outcome of researches started when all the authors were working at CORE. Thus, we would like to thank all CORE people for their unique support. We also thank E. Campioni and M. Peters for their extremely useful comments on a previous draft of this work.