Andrea Attar

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This paper aims at reassessing some central issues of monetary policy by offering a model in which a central bank tries to stabilize fluctuations in aggregate output and inflation in an adaptive complex economy. We resort to evolutionary algorithms to model the central bank behaviour under discretion, and confront the efficiency of discretion with the(More)
This paper studies a model of long-term contracting for experimentation. We consider a principal-agent relationship with adverse selection on the agent’s ability, dynamic moral hazard, and private learning about project quality. We find that each of these elements plays an essential role in structuring dynamic incentives, and it is only their interaction(More)
In this paper we present a model of credit market with several homogeneous lenders competing to finance an investment project. Contracts are non-exclusive, hence the borrower can accept whatever subset of the offered loans. We use the model to discuss efficiency issues in competitive economies with asymmetric information and non-exclusive agreements. We(More)
Multiple bank lending induces borrowers to take too much debt when creditor rights are poorly protected; moreover, banks wish to engage in opportunistic lending at their competitors’ expenses if borrowers’ collateral is sufficiently risky. These incentives lead to credit rationing and positive-profit interest rates, possibly exceeding the monopoly level. If(More)
In multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard, we provide sufficient conditions for the outcomes of pure-strategy equilibria in direct mechanisms to be preserved when principals can offer indirect communication schemes. The conditions include strong robustness in the direct mechanism game, as developed in the literature on competing mechanisms(More)
We consider an exchange economy in which a seller can trade an endowment of a divisible good whose quality she privately knows. Buyers compete in menus of nonexclusive contracts, so that the seller may choose to trade with several buyers. In this context, we show that an equilibrium always exists and that aggregate equilibrium allocations are generically(More)
We study an economy where intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. In this context, we show that, contrarily to what is commonly believed, market equilibria may fail to be efficient even if the planner is not allowed to enforce exclusivity of trades (third best inefficiency). Our setting is the same(More)
This paper studies the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) adverse selection environment, relaxing the assumption of exclusivity of insurance contracts. There are three types of agents that differ in their risk level, their riskiness is private information and known before any contract is signed. Agents can engage in multiple insurance contracts simultaneously,(More)
The work introduces a simple framework to study the relationship between competition and incentives under non-exclusivity. We characterize the equilibria of an insurance market where intermediaries compete over the contracts they offer to a single consumer in the presence of moral hazard. Non-exclusivity is responsible for under-insurance and positive(More)