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A proof-theoretic characterization of logical languages that form suitable bases for Prolog-like programming languages is provided. This characterization is based on the principle that the declarative meaning of a logic program, provided by provability in a logical system, should coincide with its operational meaning, provided by interpreting logical… (More)

Linear logic, introduced by Girard, is a refinement of classical logic with a natural, intrinsic accounting of resources. We show that unlike most other propositional (quantifier-free) logics, full propositional linear logic is undecidable. Further, we prove that without the modal storage operator, which indicates unboundedness of resources , the decision… (More)

Most formal approaches to security protocol analysis are based on a set of assumptions commonly referred to as the " Dolev-Yao model. " In this paper, we use a multiset rewriting formalism, based on linear logic, to state the basic assumptions of this model. A characteristic of our formalism is the way that existential quantification provides a succinct way… (More)

Garay, Jakobsson and MacKenzie introduced the notion of <i>abuse-free</i> distributed contract-signing: at any stage of the protocol, no participant <i>A</i>has the ability to prove to an outside party, that <i>A</i> has the power to choose between completing the contract and aborting it. We study a version of this property, which is naturally formulated in… (More)

We consider expansions of the Abadi-Rogaway logic of indistinguishability of formal cryptographic expressions. We expand the logic in order to cover cases when partial information of the encrypted plaintext is revealed. We consider not only computational, but also purely probabilistic, information-theoretic interpretations. We present a general, systematic… (More)

We develop a framework for analyzing security protocols in which protocol adversaries may be arbitrary probabilistic polynomial-time processes. In this framework, protocols are written in a form of proc=s calculus where security may be e~pr=sed in terms of obsemational equivalence, a standard relation from programming language theory that involves… (More)

Both the formal and the computational models of cryptography contain the notion of message equivalence or indistinguishability. An encryption scheme provides soundness for indistinguishability if, when mapping formal messages into the computational model, equivalent formal messages are mapped to indistinguishable computational distributions. Previous… (More)

We report on a man-in-the-middle attack on PKINIT, the public key extension of the widely deployed Kerberos 5 authentication protocol. This flaw allows an attacker to impersonate Kerberos administrative principals (KDC) and end-servers to a client, hence breaching the authentication guarantees of Kerberos. It also gives the attacker the keys that the KDC… (More)