Andrés Almazán

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Due to institutional investors' increasing ownership and interest in corporate governance, we hypothesize that the presence of institutional investors is associated with certain executive compensation structures. We find a significantly negative relation between the level of compensation and the concentration of institutional ownership, suggesting that(More)
We examine whether institutional investors affect corporate governance by analyzing portfolio holdings of institutions in companies from 23 countries during the period 2003 – 2008. We find that firm-level governance is positively associated with international institutional investment. Changes in institutional ownership over time positively affect subsequent(More)
We study how firm characteristics evolve from early business plan to initial public offering (IPO) to public company for 50 venture capital (VC)-financed companies. Firm business lines remain remarkably stable while management turnover is substantial. Management turnover is positively related to alienable asset formation. We obtain similar results using all(More)
We study benefits received by target CEOs in completed mergers and acquisitions. Certain target CEOs negotiate large cash payments in the form of special bonuses or increases in golden parachutes. These negotiated cash payments are positively associated with the CEO’s prior excess compensation and negatively associated with the likelihood that the CEO(More)
This paper studies the effect of financial crises on trade credit for a sample of 890 firms in six emerging economies. Although the provision of trade credit increases right after a crisis, it contracts in the following months and years. Firms that are financially more vulnerable to crises extend less trade credit to their customers. We argue that the(More)
We study a model of “information-based entrenchment” in which the CEO has private information that the board needs to make an efficient replacement decision. Eliciting the CEO’s private information is costly, as it implies that the board must pay the CEO both higher severance pay and higher on-the-job pay. While higher CEO pay is associated with higher(More)
Empirical studies in the corporate governance literature often use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm performance. However, our theoretical framework illustrates that the relationship between firm performance and Tobin’s Q is confounded by endogeneity. In particular, inefficiency due to underinvestment lowers firm performance but increases Tobin’s Q. We then use(More)
To identify credit availability we analyze the extensive and intensive margins of lending with loan applications and all loans granted in Spain. We find that both worse economic and tighter monetary conditions reduce loan granting, especially to firms or from banks with lower capital or liquidity ratios. Moreover, responding to applications for the same(More)
Firms that are located within industry clusters tend to make more acquisitions than their counterparts in the same industry that are not located within a cluster. As we show, if this increased tendency to acquire other firms arises because locating close to other industry participants facilitates acquisitions (e.g., by facilitating the acquisition of(More)