Anastassios Kalandrakis

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The article analyses the role of the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council in the two main legislative procedures in the European Union: cooperation and co-decision (I). We use the legislative history of some 5,000 parliamentary amendments. These procedures have been the subject of a great deal of theoretical debate. According to conventional wisdom(More)
The paper studies the impact of the EP on legislation on chemical pollutants introduced under the Cooperation procedure. A series of formal and informal analyses have predicted from significant impact of the EP, to limited impact (only in the second round) to no impact at all. Through the analysis of Parliamentary debates as well as Commission and(More)
We analyze an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar bargaining game with an endogenous reversion point. In each period a new dollar is divided among three legislators according to the proposal of a randomly recognized member — if a majority prefer so — or according to previous period's allocation otherwise. Although current existence theorems for Markovian(More)
We analyze a divide-the-dollar majority rule bargaining game with an endogenous reversion point. A new dollar is divided in each of an infinity of periods according to the proposal of a probabilistically recognized legislator — if a majority prefer so — or according to previous period's decision otherwise. Players' payoff is the discounted sum of per period(More)
Recent work shows that IMF programs hurt economic growth in the short run and finds no evidence that they help in the long run (Przeworski and Vreeland 2000). Why would governments choose to enter into programs that lower growth? It turns out that the damaging effects of IMF programs may not be evenly distributed. Two studies on the effects of IMF programs(More)
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