#### Filter Results:

- Full text PDF available (23)

#### Publication Year

1992

2017

- This year (0)
- Last 5 years (11)
- Last 10 years (21)

#### Publication Type

#### Co-author

#### Journals and Conferences

Learn More

- Alvaro Sandroni
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2003

Each period, one outcome out of finitely many possibilities is observed. Each period, a forecaster announces some probability for the future outcomes based on the available data. An outsider wants toâ€¦ (More)

- Wojciech Olszewski, Alvaro Sandroni
- Math. Oper. Res.
- 2009

Theories can be produced by individuals seeking a good reputation of knowledge. Hence, a significant question is how to test theories anticipating that they might have been produced by (potentiallyâ€¦ (More)

In this paper, we relax one of the central assumptions in game theory: that agentsâ€™ payoffs are exogenously determined by the outcomes of the game. We develop a methodology in which agentsâ€™ payoffsâ€¦ (More)

A test is said to control for type I error if it is unlikely to reject the data-generating process. However, if it is possible to produce stochastic processes at random such that, for all possibleâ€¦ (More)

- Timothy Feddersen, Alvaro Sandroni
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2006

Explaining participation in large elections is a particularly difficult problem for standard game-theoretic models. If voting is costly then, since the likelihood of a vote being pivotal is veryâ€¦ (More)

- Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky, Jonathan Weinstein
- J. Economic Theory
- 2010

We study the problem of testing an expert whose theory has a learnable and predictive parametric representation, as do standard processes used in statistics. We design a test in which the expert isâ€¦ (More)

The difficulties in properly anticipating key economic variables may encourage decision makers to rely on expertsâ€™ forecasts. The expertsâ€™ forecasts, however, may not be accurate. So, their forecastsâ€¦ (More)

It is well known that when agents are fully rational, compulsory public insurance may make all agents better oÂ¤ in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model of insurance markets. We Â…nd that when suÂ¢â€¦ (More)

Game theoretic and statistical models have emphasized the desirable information aggregation properties of large elections. However, such models do not explain why voters choose to acquire costlyâ€¦ (More)

- Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky, Rakesh V. Vohra
- Math. Oper. Res.
- 2003

Each period an outcome (out of finitely many possibilities) is observed. For simplicity assume two possible outcomes, a and b. Each period, a forecaster announces the probability of a occurring nextâ€¦ (More)