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We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with m heterogeneous items and a single buyer whose valuation v for the items may exhibit both substitutes (i.e., for some S, T , v(S ∪ T) < v(S) + v(T)) and complements (i.e., for some S, T , v(S ∪ T) > v(S) + v(T)). We show that the mechanism first proposed by Babaioff et al. [2014]-the better of selling the items(More)
Walrasian prices, if they exist, have the property that one can assign every buyer some bundle in her demand set, such that the resulting assignment will maximize social welfare. Unfortunately, this assumes carefully breaking ties amongst different bundles in the buyer demand set. Presumably, the shopkeeper cleverly convinces the buyer to break ties in a(More)
A seminal result of Bulow and Klemperer [1989] demonstrates the power of competition for extracting revenue: when selling a single item to n bidders whose values are drawn i.i.d. from a regular distribution, the simple welfare-maximizing VCG mechanism (in this case, a second price-auction) with one additional bidder extracts at least as much revenue in(More)
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