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A seminal result of Bulow and Klemperer [1989] demonstrates the power of competition for extracting revenue: when selling a single item to <i>n</i> bidders whose values are drawn i.i.d. from a regular distribution, the simple welfare-maximizing VCG mechanism (in this case, a second price-auction) with one additional bidder extracts at least as much revenue(More)
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with <i>m</i> heterogeneous items and a single buyer whose valuation <i>v</i> for the items may exhibit both substitutes (i.e., for some <i>S, T, v</i>(<i>S</i> &#8746; <i>T</i>) < <i>v</i>(<i>S</i>) + <i>v</i>(<i>T</i>)) and complements (i.e., for some <i>S, T, v</i>(<i>S</i> &#8746; <i>T</i>) &gt; <i>v</i>(<i>S</i>)(More)
Walrasian prices, if they exist, have the property that one can assign every buyer some bundle in her demand set, such that the resulting assignment will maximize social welfare. Unfortunately, this assumes carefully breaking ties amongst different bundles in the buyer demand set. Presumably, the shopkeeper cleverly convinces the buyer to break ties in a(More)
We study online auction settings in which agents arrive and depart dynamically in a random (secretary) order, and each agent’s private type consists of the agent’s arrival and departure times, value and budget. We consider multi-unit auctions with additive agents for the allocation of both divisible and indivisible items. For both settings, we devise(More)
Social goods are goods that grant value not only to their owners but also to the owners' surroundings, be it their families, friends or office mates. The benefit a non-owner derives from the good is affected by many factors, including the type of the good, its availability, and the social status of the non-owner. Depending on the magnitude of the benefit(More)
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