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We examine the dynamic formation and stochastic evolution of networks connecting individuals whose payoos from an economic or social activity depends on the network structure in place. Over time, individuals form and sever links connecting themselves to other individuals based on the improvement the resulting network ooers them relative to the current(More)
There are many situations where two interacting individuals can benefit from coordinating their actions. We examine the endogenous choice of partners in such social coordination games and the implications for resulting play. We model the interaction pattern as a network where individuals periodically have the discretion to add or sever links to other(More)
We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on equilibrium play, where play depends on the relative(More)
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