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We examine the dynamic formation and stochastic evolution of networks connecting individuals whose payoos from an economic or social activity depends on the network structure in place. Over time, individuals form and sever links connecting themselves to other individuals based on the improvement the resulting network ooers them relative to the current(More)
There are many situations where two interacting individuals can benefit from coordinating their actions. We examine the endogenous choice of partners in such social coordination games and the implications for resulting play. We model the interaction pattern as a network where individuals periodically have the discretion to add or sever links to other(More)
There are many situations where people join groups, the number of groups is fixed, and where a person can only join a new group if the new group approves the person's joining. We examine such situations where agents are concerned with either local status (each agent wants to be the highest status agent in his group) or global status (each agent wants to(More)
We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on equilibrium play, where play depends on the relative(More)
We prove existence of equilibria in bipartite social games, where players choose both a strategy in a game and a partner with whom to play the game. Such social games generalize the well-known marriage problem where players choose partners, but there are no endogenous choices subsequent to a matching. Wooders for helpful comments and suggestions.