Alfred Wagenhofer

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  • Tim Baldenius, Jonathan Glover, Marina Halac, Jack Hughes, Yuanyuan Ma, Madhav Rajan +3 others
  • 2010
Abstr act. Firms often use both objective/verifiable and subjective/non-verifiable performance measures to provide employees with effort incentives. We study a principal/multi-agent model in which a verifiable team-based performance measure and non-verifiable individual performance measures (one for each agent) are available for contracting. A problem with(More)
  • Shane Dikolli, Christian Hofmann, Thomas Pfeiffer, Ana Albuquerque, Dirk Black, Steven Balsam +19 others
  • 2012
Standard principal-agent theory is generally based on gross performance measures (i.e., before compensation expense), yet boards in practice also determine incentive compensation using net performance measures (i.e., after deducting compensation expense). In a multi-principal, multi-agent model where relative performance evaluation arises endogenously, we(More)
A widely held assumption in empirical research and policy making in capital markets is that increasing enforcement effectiveness improves financial reporting quality. In this paper, we show that it can be detrimental, even if enforcement is costless. We develop an agency model with a productive manager who can also engage in earnings management, an auditor,(More)
We develop a model to analyze how corporate governance and managerial optimism a¤ect …rms'…nancial reporting choices, and managers'incentives to manipulate accounting reports. Conservative accounting is advantageous because it enables boards to act on bad news and block investment ideas that are unattractive to shareholders but attractive to management.(More)
  • Wendelin Schnedler, George Baker, Oliver Fabel, Paul Grout, Matthias Kräkel, Jörg Oechssler +5 others
  • 2006
Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute. Research disseminated by IZA may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between(More)
  • Ashraf Jaffer, John Christensen, Amil Dasgupta, Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Leonardo Felli, Wayne Landsman +7 others
  • 2006
While tradable securities remain a popular means of compensating managers, there is constant discussion on the need for tighter regulation, including disclosure requirements, to prevent employees from actually being able to gain from trading these securities based on their private information. The purpose of this paper is to provide insights into the role(More)
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