Alexander Sebald

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Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science,(More)
We conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on and principals benefiting from a real effort task in which the agents' performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Principals give subjective performance feedback to agents and agents have an opportunity to sanction principals. In contrast to existing models of reciprocity we find that agents(More)
Randomized controlled trials (RCT) have become a dominant empirical tool in applied economics. The internal validity of RCTs crucially depends on the (implicit) assumption that the procedure assigning subjects to treatment and control groups has no effect on behavior. We show theoretically that this assumption is violated when people are motivated by(More)
One persistent finding in experimental economics is that people react very differently to outcomewise identical situations depending on the procedures which have led to them. In accordance with this, there exists a broad consensus among psychologists that not only expected outcomes shape human behavior, but also the way in which decisions are taken.(More)
Different to other scientific disciplines traditional economic theory has remained remarkably silent about procedural aspects of strategic interactions. Much to the contrast , among psychologists there is by now a broad consensus that not only expected outcomes shape human behavior, but also procedures that are used to take decisions. It is argued that(More)
We analyze the role of conflict in principal-agent environments with subjective performance evaluations, reciprocal agents and endogenous feelings of entitlements. By explicitly modeling conflict as the reciprocal reaction of agents that feel unkindly treated, we reveal intriguing welfare effects associated with the agents' personality and provide a(More)
We provide an epistemic model of dynamic psychological games with unawareness. To formulate epistemic statements, we extend Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999)'s hierarchies of conditional beliefs by constructing a space of infinite (coherent) hierarchies for each possible awareness level. The interpretation is that only hierarchies of beliefs at the highest(More)