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Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
TLDR
In this paper I study the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms for the object allocation problem. Expand
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Fairness and efficiency in a random assignment: Three impossibility results
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness andExpand
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Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules
TLDR
We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority from dominating minorities: whether a voting rule makes a majority powerful and whether minorities can veto the candidates they prefer. Expand
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Minimal Envy and Popular Matchings
TLDR
We study ex-post fairness in the object allocation problem where objects are valuable and commonly owned. Expand
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Efficient lottery design
TLDR
We propose lottery mechanisms that improve upon the widely used random serial dictatorship mechanism and a lottery representation of its competitor, the probabilistic serial mechanism. Expand
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Identifying Bid Leakage in Procurement Auctions: Machine Learning Approach
TLDR
We propose a novel machine-learning-based approach to detect bid leakage in first-price sealed-bid auctions. Expand
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How should we score athletes and candidates: geometric scoring rules
TLDR
We study whether scoring rules can be robust to adding or deleting particular candidates, as occurs with spoilers in political elections and with athletes in sports due to doping allegations. Expand
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Measuring Majority Tyranny: Axiomatic Approach
We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority to dominate minorities. For this purpose we propose a novel quantitative criterion for voting rules: the qualified mutualExpand
Comparing School Choice and College Admission Mechanisms By Their Immunity to Strategic Admissions
Recently dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the world have reformed their admission rules. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flawsExpand
Weak Mutual Majority Criterion for Voting Rules Aleksei
We study a novel axiom for voting rules: the weak mutual majority criterion (WMM). A voting rule satisfies WMM if whenever some k candidates receive top k ranks from a qualified majority thatExpand