Alexander K. Koch

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Belief Elicitation in Experiments: Is there a Hedging Problem? Belief elicitation in economics experiments usually relies on paying subjects according to the accuracy of stated beliefs in addition to payments for other decisions. Such incentives, however, allow risk-averse subjects to hedge with their stated beliefs against adverse outcomes of other(More)
Goals are an important motivator. But little is known about why and how people set them. We address these questions in a model based on two stylized facts. i) Goals serve as reference points for performance. ii) Present-biased preferences create self-control problems. We show the power and limits of self-regulation through goals. Goals increase an(More)
Preferences and Beliefs in a Sequential Social Dilemma: A Within-Subjects Analysis Within-subject data from sequential social dilemma experiments reveal a correlation of firstand second-mover decisions for which two channels may be responsible, that our experiment allows to separate: i) a direct, preference-based channel that influences both firstand(More)
Holmström’s (1982/99) career concerns model has become a workhorse for analyzing agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way, which is difficult to directly test with field data: typically little is known about the information that individuals base their decisions on. Our(More)
Aligning Ambition and Incentives In many economic situations several principals contract with the same agents sequentially. Asymmetric learning about agents' abilities provides the first principal with an informational advantage and has profound implications for the design of incentive contracts. We show that the principal always strategically distorts(More)
Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns Young professionals typically do not enter into life-long employment relations with a single firm. Therefore, future employers can learn about individuals’ abilities from the observable facts regarding earlier work relations. We show that these informational spill-overs have profound implications for(More)
Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited The Peter Principle captures two stylized facts about hierarchies: first, promotions often place employees into jobs for which they are less well suited than for that previously held. Second, demotions are extremely rare. Why do organizations not correct ‘wrong’ promotion decision? This paper(More)
Mixed Up? That's Good for Motivation An essential ingredient in models of career concerns is ex ante uncertainty about an agent's type. This paper shows how career concerns can arise even in the absence of any such ex ante uncertainty, if the unobservable actions that an agent takes influence his future productivity. By implementing effort in mixed(More)
Withinand Cross-Firm Mobility and Earnings Growth While it is well established that both promotions within firms and mobility across firms lead to significant earnings progression, little is known about the interaction between these types of mobility. Exploiting a large Danish panel data set and controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity, we show(More)