Alexander Glaser

Learn More
The verification of nuclear warheads for arms control involves a paradox: international inspectors will have to gain high confidence in the authenticity of submitted items while learning nothing about them. Proposed inspection systems featuring 'information barriers', designed to hide measurements stored in electronic systems, are at risk of tampering and(More)
Future arms-control and disarmament treaties could place numerical limits on all categories of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of weapon states, including tactical weapons, non-deployed weapons, and weapons awaiting dismantlement. Verification of such agreements is likely to require new types of inspection equipment — but also new verification protocols.(More)
We have previously proposed a " Zero-Knowledge " approach to nuclear warhead verification that avoids the need for an electronic information barrier, since sensitive information is never stored electronically. The basic concept is to use a Zero-Knowledge Protocol to make differential transmission radiographs and neutron emission measurements, comparing(More)
Zero-knowledge proofs are mathematical cryptographic methods to demonstrate the validity of a claim while providing no further information beyond the claim itself. The possibility of using such proofs to process classified and other sensitive physical data has attracted attention, especially in the field of nuclear arms control. Here we demonstrate a(More)
The verification of nuclear disarmament will require the use of adequate measurement technologies. All will need to enable inspecting parties to trust the measurement chain leading to valid and correct results, while ensuring host countries that classified information–especially warhead-design information–remains secure. However, this seems particularly(More)