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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence
For many epistemologists, and for many philosophers more broadly, it is axiomatic that rationality requires you to take the doxastic attitudes that your evidence supports. Yet there is also anotherExpand
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Is There a Distinctively Political Normativity?*
A slew of recent political theorists—many taking their cue from the political writings of Bernard Williams—have recently contended that political normativity is its own kind of normativity, distinctExpand
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Disagreement about Disagreement? What Disagreement about Disagreement?
© 2014 Alex Worsnip This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. D isagreement is a hot topic in epistemology. A fast-growing literature centersExpand
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Can Pragmatists Be Moderate
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Possibly false knowledge
Many epistemologists call themselves ‘fallibilists’. Nevertheless, it is widely thought that ‘it is possible that p’, taken in a particular way, means something like ‘for all I know, p’. And if thatExpand
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Two Kinds of Stakes
I distinguish two different kinds of practical stakes associated with propositions. The W-stakes (world) track what is at stake with respect to whether the proposition is true or false. The A-stakesExpand
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Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox
ABSTRACT Many discussions of the ‘preface paradox’ assume that it is more troubling for deductive closure constraints on rational belief if outright belief is reducible to credence. I show that thisExpand
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Metanormative Contextualism and Normative Uncertainty
We offer a new argument in favor of metanormative contextualism, the thesis that the semantic value of a normative ‘ought’ claim of the form ‘S ought to Φ’ depends on the value of one or moreExpand
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Isolating Correct Reasoning
Let me start with a threefold distinction between some different normative notions as they apply to attitudinal mental states like beliefs and intentions. The first is that of the reasons orExpand
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