Alex Possajennikov

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Tullock's analysis of rent-seeking as a contest is reconsidered from an evolutionary point of view. We show that evolutionarily stable behavior in a Tullock contest exists and differs from behavior in Nash equilibrium. Evolu-tionarily stable behavior in these contests is robust in a strong sense and may entail overdissipation of the contested rent.
By means of simulations I investigate a two-speed dynamic on strategies and preferences in the prisoners' dilemma and in the chicken game. Players learn strategies according to their preferences while evolution leads to a change in preference composition. With complete information cooperation in the prisoners' dilemma is often achieved, with " recirpocal "(More)
UEA and Warwick, to Birkbeck for its hospitality, and to the ESRC for funding under its World Economy and Finance programme (RES-156-25-0022). Abstract We add exchange to a pillage economy based on that in Jordan (2006a). We fully characterise the core and stable sets in the Edgeworth box. Jordan's core extends naturally beyond this. For particular utility(More)
The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decision-making using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, as well as theories of psychology, bounded rationality and evolutionary game(More)
The paper proves that in two-player logit form symmetric contests with concave success function, commitment to a particular strategy does not increase a player's payoff, while in contests with more than two players it does. The paper also provides a contest-like game in which commitment does not increase a player''s payoff for any number of players. I thank(More)