Alex Possajennikov

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This paper investigates theoretically and experimentally whether traders learn to use market-clearing trading institutions or whether other (inefficient) market institutions can survive in the long run. Using a framework with boundedly rational traders, we find that market clearing institutions are always stable under a general class of learning dynamics.(More)
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t Available online xxxx JEL classification: C72 C92 D83 The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a correct common prior in a two-person signaling game. Equilibrium selection arguments predict that(More)
In aggregative games, each player's payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players (for example, sum, product or some moment of the distribution of actions). Many common games in industrial organization, political economy, public economics, and macroeconomics can be cast as aggregative games. In most of these(More)
We report experiments on the following lobbying game. Two lobbyists have identical budgets and simultaneously distribute them across voters in a legislature. Each voter votes for the lobbyist who pays them most and the lobbyist who receives most votes wins a prize. Taking the share of the budget distributed to a voter as a measure of the voter " s voting(More)
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