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- Burkhard Hehenkamp, W. Leiningerb, Alex Possajennikov
- 2003

Tullock’s analysis of rent-seeking as a contest is reconsidered from an evolutionary point of view. We show that evolutionarily stable behavior in a Tullock contest exists and differs from behavior in Nash equilibrium. Evolutionarily stable behavior in these contests is robust in a strong sense and may entail overdissipation of the contested rent. JEL… (More)

This note demonstrates that a result on evolutionary stability, presented by Bester and Güth (1998), applies under more general preference and payoff functions. JEL Classification: C72; A13

This paper provides sufficient and partially necessary conditions for the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in symmetric games played by finite populations. The focus is on symmetric equilibria in pure strategies. The conditions are based on properties of the payoff function that generalize the constant-sum property and the ”smallness”… (More)

I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon.

By means of simulations I investigate a two-speed dynamic on strategies and preferences in the prisoners’ dilemma and in the chicken game. Players learn strategies according to their preferences while evolution leads to a change in preference composition. With complete information cooperation in the prisoners’ dilemma is often achieved, with ”recirpocal”… (More)

- Colin Rowat, Jim Jordan, +5 authors Nasser Zakariya
- 2009

We add exchange to a pillage economy based on that in Jordan (2006a). We fully characterise the core and stable sets in the Edgeworth box. Jordan’s core extends naturally beyond this. For particular utility functions, his stable sets extend similarly. Generically, exchange increases the opportunities for pillage: agents engaging in pillage need not expect… (More)

Agents in a large population are randomly matched to play a certain game, payoffs in which represent fitness. Agents may have preferences that are different from fitness. They learn strategies according to their preferences, and evolution changes the preference distribution in the population according to fitness. When agents know the preferences of the… (More)

- Alex Possajennikov
- IGTR
- 2003

The paper considers an imitation dynamic in the context of Cournot oligopoly. The pure ”imitate-the-best” behavior can lead to an outcome inconsistent with Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The paper extends purely imitative behavior to imperfect imitation in the two-stage model with capacities and prices. This variation in the imitative behavior improves… (More)

The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a common prior in a two-person signaling game. For a specific probability distribution of the sender’s type, the long-run behavior without an induced common prior is shown to be different from the… (More)

- Michalis Drouvelis, Wieland Müller, Alex Possajennikov
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2012

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t Available online xxxx JEL classification: C72 C92 D83 The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a correct common prior in a two-person signaling game. Equilibrium selection arguments predict that… (More)