Alex Possajennikov

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Tullock’s analysis of rent-seeking as a contest is reconsidered from an evolutionary point of view. We show that evolutionarily stable behavior in a Tullock contest exists and differs from behavior in Nash equilibrium. Evolutionarily stable behavior in these contests is robust in a strong sense and may entail overdissipation of the contested rent. JEL(More)
This paper provides sufficient and partially necessary conditions for the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in symmetric games played by finite populations. The focus is on symmetric equilibria in pure strategies. The conditions are based on properties of the payoff function that generalize the constant-sum property and the ”smallness”(More)
By means of simulations I investigate a two-speed dynamic on strategies and preferences in the prisoners’ dilemma and in the chicken game. Players learn strategies according to their preferences while evolution leads to a change in preference composition. With complete information cooperation in the prisoners’ dilemma is often achieved, with ”recirpocal”(More)
We add exchange to a pillage economy based on that in Jordan (2006a). We fully characterise the core and stable sets in the Edgeworth box. Jordan’s core extends naturally beyond this. For particular utility functions, his stable sets extend similarly. Generically, exchange increases the opportunities for pillage: agents engaging in pillage need not expect(More)
The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a common prior in a two-person signaling game. For a specific probability distribution of the sender’s type, the long-run behavior without an induced common prior is shown to be different from the(More)
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t Available online xxxx JEL classification: C72 C92 D83 The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a correct common prior in a two-person signaling game. Equilibrium selection arguments predict that(More)