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The seller of N distinct objects is uncertain about the buyer's valuation for those objects. The seller's problem, to maximize expected revenue, consists of maximizing a linear functional over a convex set of mechanisms. A solution to the seller's problem can always be found in an extreme point of the feasible set. We identify the relevant extreme points… (More)

Zero-one mechanisms are generalized take-it-or-leave-it mechanisms that consist of a price for each possible collection of goods. We illustrate that previously suggested conditions for when such mechanisms are optimal in the class of all incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms are not strong enough. We provide necessary conditions for a… (More)

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and… (More)

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