Learn More
We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and ''standard'' economic theory; we show that situations that do not at first sight look like auctions can be recast to use auction-theoretic techniques; and we argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can provide useful arguments and insights in a broad range of mainstream economic(More)
We identify a new way of ordering functions, called the interval dominance order, that generalizes both the single crossing property and a standard condition used in statistical decision theory. This allows us to provide a unified treatment of the major theorems on monotone comparative statics with and without uncertainty, the comparison of signal(More)
Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that(More)
We model a War of Attrition with N +K firms competing for N prizes. If firms must pay their full costs until the whole game ends, even after dropping out themselves (as in a standard-setting context), each firm's exit time is independent both of K and of other players' actions. If, instead, firms pay no costs after dropping out (as in a natural oligopoly),(More)
This paper examines experimental evidence relating to herd behaviour in situations when subjects can learn from each other, and can delay their decision. Subjects acted rationally, gaining from observational learning, despite penalties for delay. Cascades were ubiquitous and reverse-cascades occurred in which incorrect decisions made by early(More)
Voter turnout in game theoretic models of voting has typically been difficult to predict because of the problem of multiple Nash equilibria. Many of these equilibria require an extreme precision of beliefs among voters that is unlikely to be reached in real elections. At the same time, mechanisms like pre-election polls exist to shape the beliefs of voters(More)
This paper studies the effect of decentralization on corruption in a hierarchical organization, where decentralization is intended as the delegation of control power to lower levels in a hierarchy. Decentralization causes a loss in control to the higher levels, thus curbing their incentives to monitor and detect corrupt activities. However, it also lowers(More)
This chapter provides an elementary, non-technical survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. (The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, Klemperer, Paul (ed.) (2000a) The Economic Theory of Auctions. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.) We begin with the most fundamental concepts, and(More)