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W e develop a bargaining model in which a legislature divides a budget among particularistic and collective goods. By incorporating both private and public goods in a unified model, we uncover nonmonotonic relationships between legislative preferences for collective spending and the amount of the budget actually allocated to collective goods. Put simply,(More)
This article illustrates the use of the directed dyad-year event history analysis to study policy diffusion, with an application to policy changes in the Children's Health Insurance Program from 1998 to 2001. This analysis reveals strong evidence that states with successful policies are more likely to be emulated than are those with failing policies.(More)
This paper identifies conditions under which voters are better off not knowing the policy choices of incumbents: we show that government transparency can actually lower voter welfare. To do so, we analyze a model of political agency where voters face two forms of uncertainty: uncertainty about the incumbent's policy preferences and uncertainty about the(More)
Many policies in the United States are jointly determined by federal and state actions. In the game theoretic model offered here, politicians in both the state and national governments seek credit for providing goods desired by the public and avoid blame for the taxes necessary to provide the goods. In line with Peterson's (1995) theory of functional(More)
We present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizon. In each period, there is a societal endowment which can either be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the optimal public policy, defined by the time path of investment and consumption. In each period, a legislature with(More)
We experimentally investigate a legislative bargaining model with both public and particularistic goods. Consistent with the qualitative implications of the model: There is near exclusive public good provision in the pure public good region, in the pure private good region minimum winning coalitions sharing private goods predominate, and in the " mixed "(More)
I study a model of dynamic policy making in which citizens do not have complete knowledge of how policies are mapped into outcomes. They learn about the mapping through repeated elections as policies are implemented and outcomes observed. I characterize for this environment the policy trajectory with impatient voters. I find that through experimentation(More)
We study the targeting of political advertising by congressional candidates on television. Targeting strategies for television differ from targeting strategies for direct mail advertising or get out the vote efforts because candidates cannot target voters individually. Instead, candidates must target television programs with viewers most similar to the(More)
W e analyze the positive and normative implications of regulatory oversight when the policymak-ing agency can improve the quality of regulation through effort, but only some kinds of effort are observable by the overseer, and the overseer's only power is the ability to veto new regulation. Such oversight can increase the quality of agency regulation, but it(More)
Competitive political elites frequently o¤er con ‡icting, irreconcilable accounts of policy-relevant information. This presents a problem for members of the public who lack the skill, time, and attention to become experts on every complicated policy question that might arise. To analyze problems like these, this article presents a formal theory of political(More)