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Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you… (More)

- By Kota Saito, Daisuke Ikeda, +8 authors Kosuke Uetake
- 2011

Halevy (2008) states the equivalence between diminishing impatience (i.e., quasi–hyperbolic discounting) and the common ratio effect. The present paper shows that one way of the equivalence is false and shows the correct and general relationships: diminishing impatience is equivalent to the certainty effect and that strong diminishing impatience (i.e.,… (More)

- Akihiko Matsui
- 1989

This paper considers a large population randomly matched to play a game of common interest with cheap-talk. We apply a noncooperative solution concept to this society. A strategy distribution g is accessible from another distribution f if there is a path from f to g the direction of which is always a best response to the present distribution. A cyclically… (More)

- Mamoru Kaneko, Akihiko Matsui, JPET
- 1998

This paper proposes a new theory, which we call inductive game theory. In this theory, the individual player does not have a priori knowledge of the structure of the game that he plays repeatedly. Instead, he accumulates experiences induced by occasional random trials in the repeated play. A stationary state is required to be stable against intentional… (More)

- In-Koo Cho, Akihiko Matsui
- J. Economic Theory
- 2005

We study infinitely repeated symmetric 2×2 games played by bounded rational agents who follow a simple rule of thumb: each agent continues to play the same action if the current payoff exceeds the average of the past payoffs, and switches to the other action with a positive probability otherwise. By applying the stochastic approximation technique, we… (More)

We examine a competitive market in which producers and consumers are scattered around the economy, linked by a network with finite capacity, along which the good has to be delivered for consumption. A most prominent example would be the deregulated electric power market. Because of the complexity of transaction across the network, the equilibrium allocation… (More)

- Akihiko Matsui
- Mathematical Social Sciences
- 2000

This paper presents an equivalence result between expected utility theory (EU) and a modified version of case-based decision theory (CBDT). To be precise, it shows that a model constructed in EU can be embedded in a CBDT model, and vice versa. CBDT, proposed and axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995, Case-based decision theory, Quarterly Journal of… (More)

- Akihiko Matsui, Daisuke Oyama
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2006

This paper proposes and studies the rationalizable foresight dynamics. A normal form game is repeatedly played in a random matching fashion by a continuum of agents who make decisions at stochastic points in time. A rationalizable foresight path is a feasible path of action distribution along which each agent takes an action that maximizes his expected… (More)

- Roger Laguno, Akihiko Matsui
- 1999

Folk Theorems in repeated games hold ̄xed the game payo®s, while the discount factor is varied freely. We show that these results may be sensitive to the order of limits in situations where players move asynchronously. Speci ̄cally, we show that when moves are asynchronous, then for a ̄xed discount factor close to one there is an open neighborhood of… (More)

- Rieko Ishii, Masaki Aoyagi, +6 authors Tadashi Sekiguchi
- 2008

We examine auction data to determine if bid rigging presents in procurement auctions for paving works in Ibaraki City, Osaka, Japan. We first show that sporadic bidding wars are caused by the participation of potential “outsiders.” Assuming that the ring is all-inclusive if the auction is not the bidding war, we estimate the scheme by which the ring… (More)