Agnes Stribeck

  • Citations Per Year
Learn More
In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously excluded or imposed. We predict that the latter crowds out or at least(More)
In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payo is exogenously given whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. Earlier results for two-person generosity games show that participants seem to care more for e ciency than for equity. In three-person generosity games equal agreement payo s for(More)
An old soccer myth states that teams affected by a sending-off perform better than they would have without the penalty. Using economic theory, we analyze the course of a soccer match after a sending-off and test our hypotheses using data from the German Bundesliga from 1999 to 2009. The results show that sending-offs affecting home teams have a negative(More)
  • 1