• Publications
  • Influence
Attack, Defence, and Contagion in Networks
It is shown that in a wide variety of circumstances a star network with all defence resources allocated to the central node is optimal for the Designer and conditions on the technology of conflict, network value function and the resource configuration for which networks with multiple hubs/components are optimal.
Delegated Certification ∗
It is shown that if candidates to be certified are able to disclose information about their types, then inflexible rules imposed on certifiers could worsen certification, by crowding out information disclosure from candidates.
Conflict and Networks
Conflict remains a central element in human interaction. Networks - social, economic and infrastructure - are a defining feature of society. The two intersect in a wide range of empirical contexts.
An Equilibrium Model of Credit Rating Agencies
We develop a model of credit rating agencies (CRAs) based on reputation concerns. Ratings affect investors' choice and, thereby, also issuers' access to funding and default risk. We show that - in
How to Persuade a Long-Run Decision Maker
It is shown that, with a deadline by which the receiver must act, for intermediate precision of the news the sender generates information in dribs and drabs, and more precise news can improve the welfare of the sender even though better news means the sender loses control over the flow of information.
Competing for Talent : Wage Bargaining , Frictions , and Unraveling
We study a dynamic model of wage bargaining between a worker and two firms, with public learning about worker-specific productivity (talent). Firms make take-it-or-leaveit offers over time, and
Dynamic Persuasion With Outside Information
A principal seeks to persuade an agent to accept an offer of uncertain value before a deadline expires. The principal can generate information, but exerts no control over exogenous outside
Credit Rating and Debt Crises
We develop an equilibrium theory of credit rating in the presence of rollover risk. By influencing rational creditors, ratings affect sovereigns' probability of default, which in turn affects