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Locality and non-contextuality are intuitively appealing features of classical physics, which are contradicted by quantum mechanics. The goal of the classic no-go theorems by Bell, Kochen-Specker, et al. is to show that non-locality and contextuality are necessary features of any theory whose predictions agree with those of quantum mechanics. We use the(More)
Suppose that each player in a game is rational, each player thinks the other players are rational, and so on. Also, suppose that rationality is taken to incorporate an admissibility requirement–i.e., the avoidance of weakly dominated strategies. Which strategies can be played? We provide an epistemic framework in which to address this question.(More)
  • Adam Brandenburger, H Jerome Keisler, Gelr Asheim, Pierpaolo Battigalli, Amanda Friedenberg, Joe Halpern +2 others
  • 2001
F i r s t Version 0 6 / 1 6 / 0 0 C u r r e n t Version 0 5 / 0 8 / 0 1 E x t e n d e d A b s t r a c t 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n Iterated admissibility (weak dominance) is a long-standing and attractive solution concept, making strong predictions in many games, e.g. the forward° induction path in signalling games and the backward-induction path in perfect°(More)
Paradoxes of game-theoretic reasoning have played an important role in spurring developments in interactive epistemology, the area in game theory that studies the role of the players' beliefs, knowledge, etc. This paper describes two such paradoxes—one concerning backward-induction, the other iterated weak dominance. We start with the basic epistemic(More)
This paper studies endogenous information manipulation in games where a population can overthrow a regime if individuals coordinate. The benchmark game has a unique equilibrium and in this equilibrium propaganda is effective if signals are sufficiently precise. Despite playing against perfectly rational individuals, a regime is able to manipulate(More)
The standard framework to analyze games with incomplete information models players as if they form beliefs about their opponents' beliefs about their opponents' beliefs and so on, that is, as if players have an infinite depth of reasoning. This strong assumption has nontrivial implications, as is well known. This paper therefore generalizes the type spaces(More)