Adam Brandenburger

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According to conventional wisdom, Nash equilibrium in a game “involves” common knowledge of the payoff functions, of the rationality of the players, and of the strategies played. The basis for this wisdom is explored, and it turns out that considerably weaker conditions suffice. First, note that if each player is rational and knows his own payoff function,(More)
Suppose that each player in a game is rational, each player thinks the other players are rational, and so on. Also, suppose that rationality is taken to incorporate an admissibility requirement–i.e., the avoidance of weakly dominated strategies. Which strategies can be played? We provide an epistemic framework in which to address this question.(More)
  • BARRY NALEBUFF, Kyle Bagwell, +6 authors Michael Rior
  • 2004
In this paper we look at the case for bundling in an oligopolistic environment. We show that bundling is a particularly effective entry-deterrent strategy. A company that has market power in two goods, A and B, can, by bundling them together, make it harder for a rival with only one of these goods to enter the market. Bundling allows an incumbent to(More)
Paradoxes of game-theoretic reasoning have played an important role in spurring developments in interactive epistemology, the area in game theory that studies the role of the players’ beliefs, knowledge, etc. This paper describes two such paradoxes—one concerning backwardinduction, the other iterated weak dominance. We start with the basic epistemic(More)
Correlations arise naturally in non-cooperative games, e.g., in the equivalence between undominated and optimal strategies in games with more than two players. But the non-cooperative assumption is that players do not coordinate their strategy choices, so where do these correlations come from? The epistemic view of games gives an answer. Under this view,(More)