Abhijit Ramalingam

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Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctions. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions where punishment opportunities are restricted to agents who are linked through alternative punishment networks. We find(More)
This paper shows that it is individually rational for agents in a firm to develop and exhibit status concerns. Workers are, by their choices of status concerns, able to transfer surplus from the the firm to themselves. As expected, relative concerns are shaped by the relative strengths and weaknesses of the workers in the firm. Surprisingly, a firm's profit(More)
This paper shows that it is individually rational for agents in a firm to develop and exhibit status concerns. Workers are, by their choices of status concerns, able to transfer surplus from the the firm to themselves. Further, relative concerns are shaped by the relative strengths and weaknesses of the workers in the firm. Finally, and surprisingly, a(More)
If workers have concerns for local status, it seems plausible that firms can increase their profits by exploiting the competitive nature of their employees. This paper shows, contrary to expectations, that firms may not be able to do that; in fact, firm profits are reduced by the workers' choices of relative concerns. In doing so, this paper also offers an(More)
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