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- Publications
- Influence
Incentive effects in the demand for health care: a bivariate panel count data estimation
- R. Riphahn, A. Wambach, Andreas Million
- Economics
- 1 July 2003
This paper contributes in three dimensions to the literature on health care demand. First, it features the first application of a bivariate random effects estimator in a count data setting, to permit… Expand
Optimal Incentive Contracts Under Inequity Aversion
- F. Englmaier, A. Wambach
- Economics, Computer Science
- Games Econ. Behav.
- 1 June 2005
TLDR
Strategic Interaction in the Market for Physician Services: The Treadmill Effect in a Fixed Budget System
- A. Wambach, Franz Benstetter
- Business, Medicine
- Journal of health economics
- 1 March 2001
We examine the interaction in the market for physician services when the total budget for reimbursement is fixed. Physicians obtain points for the services they render. At the end of the period the… Expand
Introducing Heterogeneity in the Rothschild-Stiglitz Model
- A. Wambach
- Economics
- 1 December 2000
ABSTRACT In their seminal work, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have shown that in competitive insurance markets, under asymmetric information, pooling contracts cannot exist in equilibrium, firms… Expand
Wealth Effects in the Principal Agent Model
- H. Thiele, A. Wambach
- Economics
- 1 February 1998
This paper addresses the question of how the principal's surplus and agency costs depend on the agent's wealth. Our main results are: If the agent has an additively separable utility function in… Expand
An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection
- Ana B. Ania, Thomas Tröger, A. Wambach
- Economics, Computer Science
- Games Econ. Behav.
- 1 August 2002
TLDR
Competitive insurance markets under adverse selection and capacity constraints
- R. Inderst, A. Wambach
- Economics
- 1 December 2001
Ever since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) on competitive insurance markets under adverse selection the equilibrium-non-existence problem has been one of the major puzzles in… Expand
Bertrand competition under cost uncertainty
- A. Wambach
- Economics
- 1 October 1999
Abstract The Bertrand paradox states that two firms are sufficient for perfect competition. By introducing risk-averse firms under cost uncertainty we show that this result no longer holds. If firms… Expand
Insurance in a Market for Credence Goods
- Kai E. Sülzle, A. Wambach
- Business
- 1 February 2002
We study the impact of variations in the degree of insurance on the amount of fraud in a physician-patient relationship. In a market for credence goods, where prices are regulated by an authority,… Expand
New Developments in the Theory of Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance
- Wanda Mimra, A. Wambach
- Economics
- 19 September 2014
We provide an overview of the paths taken to understand existence and efficiency of equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection since the seminal work by Rothschild and… Expand
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