• Publications
  • Influence
Incentive effects in the demand for health care: a bivariate panel count data estimation
This paper contributes in three dimensions to the literature on health care demand. First, it features the first application of a bivariate random effects estimator in a count data setting, to permitExpand
  • 167
  • 17
  • PDF
Optimal Incentive Contracts Under Inequity Aversion
TLDR
We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that agents are inequity averse. Expand
  • 179
  • 13
  • PDF
Strategic Interaction in the Market for Physician Services: The Treadmill Effect in a Fixed Budget System
We examine the interaction in the market for physician services when the total budget for reimbursement is fixed. Physicians obtain points for the services they render. At the end of the period theExpand
  • 30
  • 7
  • PDF
Introducing Heterogeneity in the Rothschild-Stiglitz Model
ABSTRACT In their seminal work, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have shown that in competitive insurance markets, under asymmetric information, pooling contracts cannot exist in equilibrium, firmsExpand
  • 72
  • 5
Wealth Effects in the Principal Agent Model
This paper addresses the question of how the principal's surplus and agency costs depend on the agent's wealth. Our main results are: If the agent has an additively separable utility function inExpand
  • 48
  • 5
An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection
TLDR
We study a dynamic version of Rothschild and Stiglitz’s insurance market. Expand
  • 42
  • 4
  • PDF
Competitive insurance markets under adverse selection and capacity constraints
Ever since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) on competitive insurance markets under adverse selection the equilibrium-non-existence problem has been one of the major puzzles inExpand
  • 48
  • 4
Bertrand competition under cost uncertainty
Abstract The Bertrand paradox states that two firms are sufficient for perfect competition. By introducing risk-averse firms under cost uncertainty we show that this result no longer holds. If firmsExpand
  • 35
  • 4
Insurance in a Market for Credence Goods
We study the impact of variations in the degree of insurance on the amount of fraud in a physician-patient relationship. In a market for credence goods, where prices are regulated by an authority,Expand
  • 58
  • 4
  • PDF
New Developments in the Theory of Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance
We provide an overview of the paths taken to understand existence and efficiency of equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection since the seminal work by Rothschild andExpand
  • 26
  • 3
...
1
2
3
4
5
...