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Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets
The authors examine how market structure affects credit allocation under universal risk neutrality and asymmetric information about borrowers. They consider both monopolistic and perfExpand
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Behavioral Finance
When citing this paper, please use the following: Hirshleifer D, 2014. Title. Annu. Rev. Econ. 7,: Submitted. Doi: 10.1146/annurev-financial-092214-043752
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Overconfidence, CEO Selection, and Corporate Governance
We develop a model that shows that an overconfident manager, who sometimes makes value-destroying investments, has a higher likelihood than a rational manager of being deliberately promoted to CEOExpand
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Duration of Executive Compensation
type="main"> Extensive discussions on the inefficiencies of “short-termism” in executive compensation notwithstanding, little is known empirically about the extent of such short-termism. We develop aExpand
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Shareholder Preferences and Dividend Policy
This paper develops a theory of choice among alternative procedures for distributing cash from corporations to shareholders. Despite the preferential tax treatment of capital gains for individualExpand
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Bank Capital and Value in the Cross Section
We develop a dynamic model of bank capital structure in an acquisitions context which predicts: (i) total bank value and the bank's equity capital are positively correlated in the cross-section, andExpand
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Competitive Equilibrium in the Credit Market under Asymmetric Information
We study a competitive credit market equilibrium in which all agents are risk neutral and lenders a priori unaware of borrowers' default probabilities. Admissible credit contracts are characterizedExpand
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Bank funding modes : Securitization versus deposits
We examine a bank's choice of whether to fund the loans it originates by emitting deposits or to sell the loans to investors. With common knowledge of loan quality and laissez faire banking, we findExpand
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Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating Bank Leverage When There is Rent-Seeking and Risk-Shifting
We consider a model in which banks face two moral hazard problems: 1) asset substitution by shareholders, which can occur when banks make socially-inefficient, risky loans; and 2) managerialExpand
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Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Private Information
The authors examine equilibrium credit contracts and allocations under different competitivity specifications and explain the economic roles of collateral under these specifications. Both moralExpand
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