A. Sabelfeld

Publications
Influence

Language-based information-flow security

A. Sabelfeld, A. Myers
Computer Science
IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun.
14 January 2003

In this paper, we survey the past three decades of research on information-flow security, particularly focusing on work that uses static program analysis to enforce information flow policies. Expand

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Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs

A. Sabelfeld, David Sands
Computer Science
Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security…
3 July 2000

We present a probability-sensitive confidentiality specification-a form of probabilistic noninterference-for a small multi-threaded programming language with dynamic thread creation. Expand

A Model for Delimited Information Release

A. Sabelfeld, A. Myers
Computer Science
ISSS
2003

This paper introduces a new security property, delimited release, an end-to-end guarantee that declassification cannot be exploited to construct laundering attacks. Expand

Declassification: Dimensions and principles

A. Sabelfeld, David Sands
Computer Science
J. Comput. Secur.
1 October 2009

We provide a road map of the main directions of current research, by classifying the basic goals according to what information is released, who releases information, where in the systeminformation is released and when information can be released. Expand

Gradual Release: Unifying Declassification, Encryption and Key Release Policies

A. Askarov, A. Sabelfeld
Computer Science
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07)
20 May 2007

Information security has a challenge to address: enabling information-flow controls with expressive information release (or declassification) policies. Expand

Dynamic vs. Static Flow-Sensitive Security Analysis

Alejandro Russo, A. Sabelfeld
Computer Science
23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
17 July 2010

We prove impossibility of a sound purely dynamic information-flow monitor that accepts programs certified by a classical flow-sensitive static analysis. Expand

Information-Flow Security for a Core of JavaScript

Daniel Hedin, A. Sabelfeld
Computer Science
IEEE 25th Computer Security Foundations Symposium
25 June 2012

We develop a dynamic type system for enforcing secure information flow for core features of JavaScript: objects, higher-order functions, exceptions, and dynamic code evaluation. Expand

Dimensions and principles of declassification

A. Sabelfeld, David Sands
Computer Science
18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop…
20 June 2005

We provide a road map of the main directions of current research, by classifying the basic goals according to what information is released, who releases information, where in the system information isreleased, and when information can be released. Expand

Termination-Insensitive Noninterference Leaks More Than Just a Bit

A. Askarov, S. Hunt, A. Sabelfeld, David Sands
Computer Science
ESORICS
6 October 2008

In this paper we develop a definition of termination-insensitive noninterference suitable for reasoning about programs with outputs. Expand

Tight Enforcement of Information-Release Policies for Dynamic Languages

A. Askarov, A. Sabelfeld
Computer Science
22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
8 July 2009

We propose an intuitive and general framework for reasoning about information-release policies for expressing both what (with policies with respect to both the values of the initial memory and the values freshly received on input) can be released by an application and where in the code this release may take place. Expand

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