A. Rubinstein

We show that if D is a distribution over subadditive valuations with independent items, then the better of pricing each item separately or pricing only the grand bundle achieves a constant-factor approximation to the revenue of the optimal mechanism. Expand

We formulate a general and relatively natural notion of an extractable collision-resistant hash function (ECRH) and show that, if ECRHs exist, then a modified version of Di Crescenzo and Lipmaa’s protocol is a succinct non-interactive argument for NP. Expand

We prove that finding an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete for constant ε and a particularly simple class of games: polymatrix, degree 3 graphical games, in which each player has only two actions. Expand

We present a new distributed} model of probabilistically checkable proofs (PCP). Expand

We prove conditional near-quadratic running time lower bounds for approximate Bichromatic Closest Pair with Euclidean, Manhattan, Hamming, or edit distance. Expand

We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. Expand

We prove that there exists a constant ε > 0 such that, assuming the Exponential Time Hypothesis for PPAD, computing an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player (n × n) game requires quasi-polynomial time, nlog1-o(1) n. Expand

We conjecture that PPAD has a PCP-like complete problem, seeking a near equilibrium in which all but very few players have very little incentive to deviate. Expand

We study the adaptivity of submodular maximization and show that no algorithm can achieve a constant factor approximation in $\tilde{o}(\log n) adaptive rounds. Expand

We introduce a novel framework of Prophet Inequalities for combinatorial valuation functions. Expand