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Is perception informationally encapsulated?: The issue of the theory-ladenness of perception
TLDR
Fodor has argued that observation is theory neutral, since the perceptual systems are modular, that is, they are domain-specific, encapsulated, mandatory, fast, hard-wired in the organism, and have a fixed neural architecture. Expand
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Cognition and Perception: How Do Psychology and Neural Science Inform Philosophy?
In Cognition and Perception, Athanassios Raftopoulos discusses the cognitive penetrability of perception and claims that there is a part of visual processes (which he calls "perception") that resultsExpand
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Reentrant Neural Pathways and the Theory-Ladenness of Perception
In this paper I argue for the cognitive impenetrability of perception by undermining the argument from reentrant pathways. To do that I will adduce psychological and neuropsychological evidenceExpand
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The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives
I. DEFINITIONAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES II. MODULARITY, ENCAPSULATION AND IMPENETRABILITY III. SUBSTANTIVE IMPENETRABILITY AND PENETRABILITY CLAIMS IV. COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY AND THE PHENOMENOLOGYExpand
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The phenomenal content of experience
Abstract:  We discuss in some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrievedExpand
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Nonconceptual Demonstrative Reference
TLDR
The paper argues that the reference of perceptual demonstratives is fixed in a causal nondescriptive way through the nonconceptual content of perception. Expand
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Perceptual Learning Meets Philosophy: Cognitive Penetrability of Perception and its Philosophical Implications
Perceptual Learning Meets Philosophy: Cognitive Penetrability of Perception and its Philosophical Implications Athanassios Raftopoulos (raftop@ucy.ac.cy) Department of Educational Sciences UniversityExpand
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The cognitive impenetrability of the content of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for purely nonconceptual content
I elaborate on Pylyshyn's definition of the cognitive impenetrability (CI) of early vision, and draw on the role of concepts in perceptual processing, which links the problem of the CI or cognitiveExpand
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The Cognitive Impenetrability of Perception and Theory-Ladenness
In this paper, I claim that since (a) there is a cognitively impenetrable (CI) stage of visual perception, namely early vision, and (b) cognitive penetrability (CP) and theory-ladenness areExpand
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What Unilateral Visual Neglect Teaches us About Perceptual Phenomenology
Studies on the syndrome called ‘unilateral visual or spatial neglect’ have been used by philosophers in discussions concerning perceptual phenomenology. Nanay (Philos Perspect 26:235–246, 2012),Expand
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