A structured view of research on information-flow security is given, particularly focusing on work that uses static program analysis to enforce information- flow policies, and some important open challenges are identified.
The new language JFlow is described, an extension to the Java language that adds statically-checked information flow annotations and provides several new features that make information flow checking more flexible and convenient than in previous models.
This paper presents a new model for controlling information flo w in systems with mutual distrust and decentralized authority that improves on existing multilevel security models by allowing users to declassify information in a decentralized way, and by improving support for fine-grained data sharing.
The article introduces the language Jif, an extension to Java that provides static checking of information flow using the decentralized label model, which improves on existing multilevel security models by allowing users to declassify information in a decentralized way, and by improving support for fine-grained data sharing.
This paper presents a relatively expressive secure concurrent calculi, provides first-class channels, high-order functions, and an unbounded number of threads.
A new security property, delimited release, an end-to-end guarantee that declassification cannot be exploited to construct laundering attacks is introduced, and a security type system is given that straightforwardly and provably enforces delimite release.
The rationale for the design decisions and the impact of the extension on other parts of Java, including arrays and the class library are discussed, and optional extensions to the Java virtual machine to allow parameterized bytecodes are described, and how to verify them efficiently.