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Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators
Using options- and press-based proxies for CEO overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate 2005a, 2005b, 2008), we find that over the 1993-2003 period, firms with overconfident CEOs have greater returnExpand
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Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation
I study managers' risk-taking behavior and how it is affected by equity-based compensation. I find that in response to an exogenous increase in takeover protection in Delaware during the mid-1990s,Expand
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Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors
Companies actively seek to appoint outside CEOs to their boards. Consistent with our matching theory of outside CEO board appointments, we show that such appointments have a certification benefit forExpand
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Non-Executive Employee Stock Options and Corporate Innovation
We provide empirical evidence on the positive effect of non-executive employee stock options on corporate innovation. The positive effect is more pronounced when employees are more important forExpand
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The Dark Side of Outside Directors: Do They Quit When They are Most Needed?
Outside directors have incentives to resign to protect their reputation or to avoid an increase in their workload when they anticipate that the firm on whose board they sit will perform poorly orExpand
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Stakeholder Orientation and the Cost of Debt : Evidence from a Natural Experiment
We examine the causal effect of stakeholder orientation on firms’ costs of debt. Our test exploits the staggered adoption of state-level constituency statutes, which allow directors to considerExpand
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Monitoring the Monitor: Distracted Institutional Investors and Board Governance
Boards are crucial to shareholder wealth. Yet little is known about how shareholder oversight affects director incentives. Using exogenous shocks to institutional investor portfolios, we find thatExpand
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Does Corporate Culture Matter for Firm Policies
Economic theories suggest that a firm's corporate culture matters for its policy choices. We construct a parent-spinoff firm panel dataset that allows us to identify culture effects in firm policiesExpand
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The dark side of outside directors : Do they quit ahead of trouble ?
Outside directors have incentives to resign to protect their reputation or to avoid an increase in their workload when they anticipate that the firm on whose board they sit will perform poorly orExpand
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Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators? (Presentation Slides)
This is the set of presentation slides for the paper "Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators?" Previous empirical work on adverse consequences of CEO overconfidence raises the question of whyExpand
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