• Publications
  • Influence
Overconfidence, CEO Selection, and Corporate Governance
We develop a model that shows that an overconfident manager, who sometimes makes value-destroying investments, has a higher likelihood than a rational manager of being deliberately promoted to CEOExpand
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Why Do Firms Smooth Earnings
We explain why a firm may smooth reported earnings. Greater earnings volatility leads to a bigger informational advantage for informed investors over uninformed investors. If sufficiently manyExpand
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CEO Overconfidence and Dividend Policy
We develop a model of the dynamic interaction between CEO overconfidence and dividend policy. The model shows that an overconfident CEO views external financing as costly and hence builds financialExpand
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EPRI Transmission Line Reference Book : wind-induced Conductor Motion.
Addressing an Urgent Challenge Probably no other large structure has as much of its mass in highly flexible form, and so continuously exposed to the forces of the wind, as does the modernExpand
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Optimal Contracts When Agents Envy Each Other
We examine the characteristics of endogenously-determined optimal incentive contracts for agents who envy each other and work for a risk-neutral (non-envious) principal. Envy makes each agent careExpand
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Information Reliability and Welfare: A Theory of Coarse Credit Ratings
An enduring puzzle is why credit rating agencies (CRAs) use a few categories to describe credit qualities lying in a continuum, even when ratings coarseness reduces welfare. We model a cheap-talkExpand
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Credit Ratings and Litigation Risk
We develop a model of a credit rating agency in which the rating agency expends due-diligence effort to learn about the issuer's credit risk, and the precision of its rating is predicated both onExpand
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Do CEO Beliefs Affect Corporate Cash Holdings?
We develop an expanded trade-off model of cash holdings that incorporates CEO beliefs. The optimistic CEO views external financing as excessively costly but expects this cost to decline over time,Expand
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Easy weighted majority games
We prove that the problem of determining whether or not there exists a coalition for which a given player is pivotal is NP-complete for weighted majority games. Expand
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Career Concerns and Resource Allocation in Conglomerates
We investigate resource allocation decisions in conglomerates when managers are motivated by career concerns. When divisional cash flows are differentially informative about managerial ability, weExpand
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