• Publications
  • Influence
A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information
This paper develops a positive theory of credibility, ambiguity, and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information. The monetary policymaker maximizes his own (politically motivated)Expand
  • 1,192
  • 83
  • PDF
Seigniorage and Political Instability
The importance of seignorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly across countries. The main theoretical implication of this paper is that countries with more unstable andExpand
  • 704
  • 43
  • PDF
Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment - Theory and Some Evidence
This paper proposes a conceptual framework that makes it possible to investigate the effects of central bank independence, the degree of centralization of wage bargaining and the interaction betweenExpand
  • 383
  • 32
  • PDF
When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China
Substantial policy changes, like market-oriented reforms by populist parties and steps towards peace by 'hawks,' are sometimes implemented by 'unlikely' parties. To account for such episodes, thisExpand
  • 366
  • 22
  • PDF
Accountability, Credibility, Transparency and Stabilization Policy in the Eurosystem
This paper surveys and evaluates alternative views regarding the desirable combination of accountability, credibility and trasnparency in the newly created ECB (European Central Bank), includingExpand
  • 161
  • 21
Political Influence on the Central Bank- International Evidence
Political influence on the central bank is measured bere by looking at the probability that a central bank governor will be replaced shortly after a political change of government. The governorExpand
  • 251
  • 19
A Political Theory of Government Debt and Deficits in a Neo-Ricardian Framework
In the presence of different abilities, and therefore different bequests, some individuals are bequest constrained even in a neo-Ricardian world. Such individuals vote for taxes on futureExpand
  • 321
  • 18
  • PDF
Rational expectations and the role of monetary policy: A generalization
Abstract This paper investigates the effects of introducing the following two alterations into a multimarket, partial information, rational expectations model; (1) individuals in any market mayExpand
  • 158
  • 17
Central Bank Independence and Monetary Control
ing from details, these conclusions imply that inflation is lower the higher is CBI and that, given independence, countries that pre-announce monetary policy have even lower rates of inflation.Expand
  • 137
  • 16
The Inflation Bias Result Revisited
The Kydland-Prescott, Barro-Gordon inflation bias result relies on the presumption that policymakers aim at achieving a level of employment above the normal level. This presumption has been recentlyExpand
  • 99
  • 14