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Experience and Content
In the dark ages perceptual experiences were supposed to consist in the direct awareness of sense data, which are as they appear to be. Perceptual infallibility was the creed, with error blamedExpand
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Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness
Conscious experience presents a deep puzzle. On the one hand, a fairly robust materialism must be true in order to explain how it is that conscious events causally interact with non-conscious,Expand
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Knowing That I Am Thinking
Soc. . . . I speak of what I scarcely understand; but the soul when thinking appears to me to be just talking—asking questions of herself and answering them, affirming and denying. And when she hasExpand
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Transparency, Belief, Intention
This paper elaborates and defends a familiar ‘transparent’ account of knowledge of one's own beliefs, inspired by some remarks of Gareth Evans, and makes a case that the account can be extended toExpand
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High-Level Colloquium on Information Literacy and Lifelong LearningBibliotheca Alexandrina, Alexandria, Egypt - Report of Meeting
Report of a Meeting Sponsored by the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), National Forum on Information Literacy (NFIL) and the International Federation ofExpand
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POSSIBILITY AND IMAGINATION
In the argument’s more recent and general dress, what is said to be conceivable/imaginable is that “zombies” exist (see, e.g., Chalmers 1996: 94-9), but let us concentrate on Argument K. Descartes’Expand
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SOME LIKE IT HOT: CONSCIOUSNESS AND HIGHER-ORDER THOUGHTS
Evaluation de l'hypothese de la pensee d'un ordre superieur (higher-order thought, or HOT) chez Rosenthal et des principales objections -dont celle de F. Dretske- qui lui sont opposees concernant laExpand
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Disjunctivism : contemporary readings
A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception concerns the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience. Until the 1960s, philosophers of perception generally assumed that a veridicalExpand
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Recollection, perception, imagination
The question can equally well be asked about other modalities a purring cat could be substituted for a sleeping one, for example. But the chief examples will be visual. Despite the similaritiesExpand
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