• Publications
  • Influence
Active Institutional Shareholders and Costs of Monitoring: Evidence from Executive Compensation
Although evidence suggests that institutional investors play a role in monitoring management, not all institutions are equally willing or able to serve this function. We present a stylized model thatExpand
  • 508
  • 37
Entrenchment and Severance Pay in Optimal Governance Structures
TLDR
This paper explores how motivating an incumbent CEO to undertake actions that improve the effectiveness of his management interacts with the firm's policy on CEO replacement. Expand
  • 370
  • 37
  • PDF
Why Constrain Your Mutual Fund Manager?
We examine the form, adoption rates, and economic rationale for the investment restrictions found in the contracts between mutual fund investors and managers. Based on a sample of U.S. domesticExpand
  • 279
  • 34
  • PDF
Financial Structure, Acquisition Opportunities, and Firm Locations
This paper investigates the relation between firms' locations and their corporate finance decisions. We develop a model where being located within an industry cluster increases opportunities to makeExpand
  • 158
  • 12
Intra-Industry Capital Structure Dispersion
Why do firms in some industries exhibit very similar debt ratios, while firms in other industries do not? This paper examines the dispersion in leverage ratios among firms within an industry, andExpand
  • 80
  • 10
A Model of Competition in Banking: Bank Capital vs. Expertise
This paper presents a model of competition in the banking industry based upon the interplay of two factors: the level of capitalization of banks and their ability to monitor different types ofExpand
  • 89
  • 8
  • PDF
Attracting Attention: Cheap Managerial Talk and Costly Market Monitoring
We provide a theory of informal communication-cheap talk-between firms and capital markets that incorporates the role of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. The analysis suggests thatExpand
  • 60
  • 8
  • PDF
Firm Location and the Creation and Utilization of Human Capital
This paper presents a theory of location choice that draws on insights from the incomplete contracts and investment flexibility (real option) literatures. We provide conditions under which humanExpand
  • 102
  • 6
  • PDF
Managerial Compensation and the Market Reaction to Bank Loans
This Paper considers why a manager would choose to submit himself to the discipline of bank monitoring. This issue is analysed within the context of a model where the manager enjoys private benefits,Expand
  • 44
  • 5
  • PDF
Firms' Stakeholders and the Costs of Transparency
We develop a model of a firm whose production process requires it to start and nurture a relationship with its stakeholders. Because there are spillover benefits associated with being associated withExpand
  • 26
  • 1
  • PDF