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Reinforcement learning and stochastic fictitious play are apparent rivals as models of human learning. They embody quite different assumptions about the processing of information and optimization. This paper compares their properties and finds that they are far more similar than were thought. In particular, the expected motion of stochastic fictitious play(More)
The random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is a common method for assigning objects to individuals. The mechanism is easy to implement and strategy-proof. However this mechanism is inefficient, as the agents may be made all better off by another mechanism that increases their chances of obtaining more preferred objects. Such an inefficiency(More)
We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus. Players that reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network. We prove that for each discount factor all equilibria are payoff equivalent. The equilibrium payoffs and the set of equilibrium(More)
We examine the robustness of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes under two elicitation procedures. We find that individuals are, on average, risk-seeking over low-probability gains and high-probability losses and risk-averse over high-probability gains and low-probability losses when we elicit prices for the gambles. However, a choice-based elicitation(More)
Many real matching markets are subject to distributional constraints. These constraints often take the form of restrictions on the numbers of agents on one side of the market matched to certain subsets of the other side. Real-life examples include restrictions imposed on regions in medical residency matching, academic master’s programs in graduate school(More)
1 http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/mba/academics/learning_methods.html, accessed March 22, 2007. * Ostrovsky: Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 (e-mail: ostrovsky@gsb. stanford.edu); Schwarz: Yahoo! Labs, 2397 Shattuck Ave., Suite 204, Berkeley, CA 94704 (e-mail: mschwarz@ yahoo-inc.com). We are grateful to Drew Fudenberg, Kate(More)
In an attempt to increase the placement of medical residents to rural hospitals, the Japanese government recently introduced “regional caps” which restrict the total number of residents matched within each region of the country. The government modified the deferred acceptance mechanism incorporating the regional caps. This paper shows that the current(More)
This article provides an axiomatic characterization of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and a more general class of semi-hyperbolic preferences. We impose consistency restrictions directly on the intertemporal trade-offs by relying on what we call ‘‘annuity compensations.’’ Our axiomatization leads naturally to an experimental design that disentangles(More)
In an attempt to increase the placement of medical residents in rural hospitals, the Japanese government recently introduced “regional caps” which restrict the total number of residents matched within each region of the country. To accommodate regional caps, the government modified the deferred acceptance mechanism in a particular manner. Motivated by this(More)
Experimentalists frequently claim that human subjects in the laboratory violate such game-theoretic solutions as Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. It is here argued that this claim is usually premature. What have been rejected are certain joint hypotheses concerning subjects’ preferences, rationality and knowledge. This note discusses(More)