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- Özgür Kibris
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2004

A bargaining rule isordinally invariant if its solutions are independent of which utility functio are chosen to represent the agents’ preferences. For two agents, only dictatorial bargaini satisfy… (More)

- Özgür Kibris
- Social Choice and Welfare
- 2003

We introduce a new class of problems that contains two existing classes: allocation problems with single-peaked preferences and bankruptcy problems. On this class, we analyze the implications of… (More)

- Özgür Kibris, Murat R. Sertel
- Social Choice and Welfare
- 2007

We analyze bilateral bargaining over a finite set of alternatives. We look for “good” ordinal solutions to such problems and show that Unanimity Compromise and Rational Compromise are the only… (More)

- Özgür Kibris
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2002

In order to analyze bargaining in pure exchange and public good economies when the agents are not informed about their opponents’ payoffs, we embed each bargaining problem into a noncooperative game… (More)

- Anirban Kar, Özgür Kibris
- Social Choice and Welfare
- 2008

We consider the problem of allocating multiple social endowments (estates) of a perfectly divisible commodity among a group of agents with singlepeaked preferences when each agent’s share can come… (More)

- Özgür Kibris, Arzu Kibris
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2013

Axiomatic analysis of bankruptcy problems reveals three major principles: (i) proportionality (PRO), (ii) equal awards (EA), and (iii) equal losses (EL). However, most real life bankruptcy procedures… (More)

- Özgür Kibris, Ipek Gürsel Tapki
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2010

We analyze bargaining situations where the agents’ payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash… (More)

- Mark Dean, Özgür Kibris, Yusufcan Masatlioglu
- J. Economic Theory
- 2017

We introduce and axiomatically characterize a model of status quo bias in which the status quo a¤ects choices by both changing preferences and focusing attention. The resulting Limited Attention… (More)

- Özgür Kibris, Serkan Küçüksenel
- Social Choice and Welfare
- 2009

We analyze markets in which the price of a traded commodity is such that the supply and the demand are unequal. Under standard assumptions, the agents then have single peaked preferences on their… (More)

- Özgür Kibris, Ipek Gürsel Tapki
- Mathematical Social Sciences
- 2011

We analyze bargaining situations where the agents’ payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash… (More)